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that Iran acquired any railways or modern industry. Iran was also subject before 1914 to continual foreign interference because of its geopolitical situation between the Russian Empire and British India [13] .
An immediate question is why British investors should want to found a bank in such a country. The peculiar answer is that the bank was founded by mistake. The story went back to a Concession given in 1872 to Baron Julius de Reuter, naturalized Briton and founder of Reuters' News Agency, which granted him control over most of Iran's natural resources. Long regarded as a deplorable example of the corrupt ruling Qajar Shahs' selling their country to Western capitalists, the Reuter Concession is more accurately portrayed as a serious attempt by the government to promote economic growth [16, p. 21]. The core of the Concession was a plan to build railways, which the government recognized it had neither the capital nor technology to construct itself. The Reuter Concession, however, was opposed within Iran and by Russia, forcing the Shah to cancel it, and it was not until 1889 that Reuter was able to get compensation.
In 1887 the Russians forced the Shah to agree not to give railway concessions to any foreign company without their permission. Reuter had a brilliant idea. An obscure article in the 1872 Concession had given him the right to establish a national bank. Reuter argued that such an institution would be an Iranian rather than a foreign company, and therefore free from the Russian veto on building railways. The Shah liked the idea, and almost to the last moment of the negotiations for the Imperial Bank's Concession (signed January 30, 1889), the Iranians and the British were preoccupied by railways. However, Russian pressure forced the omission of the magic word "railway" from The upshot is that while one can take the view that the Imperial Bank were rapacious capitalists, one has to acknowledge that they were not particularly successful rapacious capitalists. 
CONCLUSION
In nationalist literature in Iran the Imperial Bank, like the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, has often featured as a rapacious capitalist and imperialist agent. While serious criticisms can be leveled at the Bank's policies, the overall picture often appears closer to farce than to wickedness. Established by people who wanted to build a railway rather than run a bank, the Bank had a struggle to make profits even when it held a banking monopoly. It made most money when the British Army occupied or fought in Iran during the two World Wars. In the interwar years, the Bank's political judgment was jejune, and in the 1940s it was crippled by the actions of an aggrieved former employee now heading its national rival. However, it must be admitted that unlike many British overseas banks, and even more British "free-standing companies," the Imperial Bank survived.
The impact of the Bank on the Iranian economy was a mixture of costs and benefits, but it does seem that the benefits outweighed the costs before the 1920s, even though the Bank could have done better. During the 1930s the Bank's hostility to Iranian government policies, especially industrialization, only added to the many obstacles in the way of economic development.
A final reflection takes an Iranian government perspective. The nineteenth century Shahs had originally sought the assistance of foreign businessmen such as Reuter to modernize their economy. Although they preferred a railway to a bank, they had persuaded a group of British capitalists to establish a bank, and transfer sufficient skills and resources to Iran to ensure its survival. This institution had given Iran a modern banking system; facilitated trade; issued a paper currency; financed the government; mobilized savings; and provided a cadre of skilled Iranian bankers. When, from the 1920s, Iran had developed sufficient resources to have its own bank, the services of the Imperial Bank were unceremoniously disposed of. In a long-term perspective, at least, Iran did well from this foreign direct investment.
